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Abstract 
 
An accident model based on fault tree analysis was developed and applied to analyze the 
recurrence of undesired reactions producing popcorn polymers in the overhead condenser 
of an industrial butadiene distillation column. The modeling framework incorporates reliability 
data associated with asset integrity and human performance along with data on selected 
process variables. These variables, i.e., pressure, feed velocity and temperature of the 
condenser, which were identified from root cause analysis of the incident provided dynamic 
contributions to the model, and were represented in the form of Weibull distribution functions. 
The results obtained proved the potentials of the proposed methodology. Based on the case 
study considered, operating pressure was identified as the most influential process variables 
that needed closer monitoring. The methodology provides an opportunity for risk 
management to be implemented dynamically to facilitate maintenance plan and 
management of change.   
 
Keywords: Operational risk, fault tree, dynamic probability, Weibull distribution, popcorn 
polymerization 
 
Abstrak 
 
Satu model kemalangan berdasarkan analisis kegagalan pokok telah dibina dan digunakan 
untuk menganalisis tindak balas tidak diingini yang menghasilkan polimer bertih jagung 
secara berulang-ulang di bahagian atas pemeluwap pada kolum penyulingan industri 
butadiene. Rangka kerja pemodelan menggabungkan data kebolehpercayaan integriti 
aset dan prestasi manusia bersama dengan data pembolehubah proses yang telah dipilih. 
Pembolehubah ini iaitu tekanan, halaju suapan dan suhu pemeluwap yang telah dikenal 
pasti daripada analisis punca asas kejadian, telah memberikan sumbangan dinamik kepada 
model dan disampaikan dalam bentuk fungsi taburan Weibull. Keputusan yang diperolehi 
membuktikan potensi kaedah yang dicadangkan. Berdasarkan kajian kes, tekanan operasi 
telah dikenal pasti sebagai pemboleh ubah proses yang paling berpengaruh yang 
memerlukan pemantauan yang lebih rapi. Kaedah ini memberi peluang bagi pengurusan 
risiko dilaksanakan secara dinamik untuk memudahkan pelan penyelenggaraan dan 
pengurusan perubahan. 
 
Kata kunci: Risiko operasi, carta kegagalan, kebarangkalian dinamik, taburan Weibull, 
pempolimeran bertih jagung 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Butadiene (BD) is a major product from 
petrochemicals industries that is widely used as a 
monomer in the manufacturing of synthetic rubbers. It 
is carcinogenic and has strong tendency to react with 
large range of chemicals to form polymers, thus 
requiring special handlings and stringent operating 
procedures. Several researchers [1–4] have studied 
the reactivity of butadiene under various conditions 
and concluded that reactions of butadiene in the 
presence of peroxide or any free radical initiators may 
lead to the formation variety of polymers. Since these 
reactions are not intended by the process design, 
variety of safety and operability issues may arise. 
Some of these unwanted polymers are commonly 
known as popcorn polymers, which are hard, opaque 
and porous. Popcorn polymers grow exponentially, 
particularly in the presence of seeds or oxygen and 
dust. Their rapid growth generate high pressure and 
temperature conditions resulting in sudden rupture or 
plugging in process facilities such as tube rupture in 
overhead condenser and bulging of condenser shell 
in a distillation process [1]. In addition to potential 
damages to process equipment, this condition may 
also lead to toxic and flammable butadiene release 
that can potentially cause fire and explosion. 
Due to these hazardous risks, special 
considerations are made in the design and operation 
of processes involving BD. For example, dead zones 
are avoided in the structure of storage vessels and 
piping systems to prevent the accumulation of 
stagnant highly concentrated BD. Both pressure-
discharging and emergency systems are also installed 
as part of the mitigating measures. However, high 
boiling points of many of these inhibitors render them 
effective primarily in the liquid phase leaving the 
gaseous phase more vulnerable to reaction initiation. 
Furthermore, since BD reacts readily with oxygen to 
form polymeric and peroxides that are initiators for 
polymerization, it is imperative to prevent oxygen 
contact with BD. Due to these conditions, some 
practical initiatives are typically implemented in the 
industrial BD extraction process including: 
i. Metal surface passivation and removal of 
popcorn polymer seeds, which can mitigate the 
tendency of polymerization  
ii. Regular air-tightness test at potential ingress point 
such as flanges 
iii. Addition of antioxidants such as 4-tertiary butyl 
catechol (TBC) or butyl-lated hydroxy toluene 
(BHT) which can remove the free radicals that are 
known to initiate rapid exothermic 
polymerizations 
iv. Scheduled monitoring  of oxygen, peroxides and 
inhibitors contents  
 
Despite all these measures, undesired 
polymerizations of BD continues to occur in the 
process industry leading to many incidents [4], and 
additional measures are therefore needed. One 
common approach is to periodically revisit the fitness 
of the plant safety and operability by conducting 
process hazard analysis techniques such as hazard 
and operability (HAZOP) study or layer of protection 
analysis (LOPA). This has also been a standard 
practice by most process plants as it has been 
incorporated in the legislation or adopted as best 
practices in many countries. Another alternative, 
which is essentially the focus of this paper, is to provide 
accident modeling and prediction capability so that 
corrective measures can be planned and 
implemented ahead of time. These can be 
incorporated as part of the preventive maintenance 
schedule or plant upgrades and revamps. 
Several risk analysis techniques can be adopted to 
construct suitable accident model of a process. These 
include fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis 
(ETA), bow-tie model and quantitative risk assessment. 
FTA has been widely used to model accidents in 
various case studies [5,6]. It is a deductive approach 
focusing on a top event for calculating the frequency 
of intermediate and base events. On the contrary, ETA 
is an inductive approach that identifies and evaluates 
potential consequences based on the top event to 
determine the probability of its consequences. Taking 
the advantage of these models, a bow-tie model was 
formulated to assimilate an accident scenario to a 
sequence of events and a sequence of mitigation 
barriers [7]. However, it is more difficult to be applied 
for large scale systems and is not widely recognized in 
the context of dynamic risk analysis. 
In this paper, an operational risk analysis approach 
is proposed to predict the probability of popcorn 
formation in a condenser of a butadiene column. 
While this framework is based on FTA technique, it is 
integrated with covariate models to incorporate 
process dynamics, thus offering dynamic risk 
assessment capability that is much needed to address 
the influence of process operation towards the 
vulnerability of process equipment and likelihood of 
accidents.  
 
 
2.0  CASE STUDY: POPCORN IN BUTADIENE 
(BD) OVERHEAD CONDENSER 
 
2.1  Overview of BD Extraction Unit 
 
A schematic diagram of the BD extraction process 
considered as the case study is shown in Figure 1. The 
unit is designed to separate a C4 hydrocarbon 
mixtures containing butanes, butenes, butadiene, C3 
acetylenes and C4 acetylenes into two product 
streams; one containing mainly 1,3 butadiene product 
and the other containing the C4 raffinates. In this 
process, the feed is first separated in an extractive 
distillation unit using N–methyl–2–pyrrolidone (NMP) as 
the entrainer. The crude butadiene stream leaving the 
extractive process is then further purified in a two-
stage conventional distillation process. In the first 
stage, propene is removed, while heavier 
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components are removed in the second stage that is 
known as the BD column.  
 
Figure 1 Overall block flow diagram of BD extraction process 
 
 
The schematic diagram of the BD column is shown 
in Figure 2. The column receives crude BD as a feed 
and purify the desired 1,3 Butadiene product to the 
required product specification. At the top of the 
column, the overhead vapors are condensed in a 
vertical condenser, and the liquid is collected in an 
accumulator. Part of the liquid that leaves the 
accumulator is refluxed back to the column, while the 
remainder is drawn as product. This BD product is then 
cooled to 5°C in a product cooler. To maintain 
desirable product properties, an inhibitor, i.e., diluted 
TBC solution is sprayed into the condenser to reduce 
the propensity for polymer formation. Additional TBC is 
also added to the product before being sent to the 
storage. 
 
Figure 2 BD column process flow diagram 
 
 
2.2   Popcorn Accident 
 
In the middle of 2009, bulging was observed for the first 
time in the BD column overhead condenser in a 
petrochemical plant, 13 months after the unit was 
commissioned. This incident was caused by the rapid 
polymerization reaction to produce popcorn 
polymers in the shell side of the vertical condenser. It 
was suspected that the polymerization took place 
either due to free radical mechanisms with initiator 
such as oxygen, peroxide, and dust; or due to highly 
concentrated stagnant BD accumulated in one area. 
Subsequently, several efforts were taken to improve 
the cooling water system. These include replacing the 
manual injection procedure with automatic caustic 
solution injection to provide better pH control, close 
monitoring on the tightness of flanges and seals, and 
replacement of the side stream filter sand.  
However, a second failure occurred about a year 
later in May 2010, causing a total loss of around USD 
700,000. More preventive measures were then 
implemented including the addition of chemical 
injection system to feed anti–polymerant (radical 
scavenger) as additional protection against popcorn 
formation in the condenser. To avoid accumulation of 
concentrated stagnant BD and/or other initiators in 
the shell side of the condenser, six flushing lines with 
individual spray nozzle were installed. In addition, a 
vent line was also added to periodically vent off 
oxygen to the flare system.  
Unfortunately, despite these measures, in June 
2012, minor bulging was again observed in the BD 
overhead condenser. According to the final 
investigation report issued by the investigation team, 
potential root causes of the problems include faults in 
design and operation of process facilities such as 
failure in chemical treatment, ingress of impurities or 
failure related to process operation leading to 
undesired rapid polymerization. The failure of 
chemical treatment can be caused by insufficient 
injection of TBC or anti–polymerant. Deficiencies in 
side stream sand filter, flanges or seals at piping or 
equipment or incomplete passivation process during 
plant startup can lead to ingress of impurities such as 
polymer seed from upstream process, oxygen and rust 
into overhead condenser, causing rapid 
polymerization in the shell side of the overhead 
condenser. The growth of popcorn polymer then 
propagates until eventually causing the bulging of the 
condenser. A number of initiatives have been 
proposed to tackle the issue with detailed study 
needed prior to implementation due to high capital 
cost investment. 
 
 
3.0  MODELING FRAMEWORK 
 
In the search of more insights on the incidents, an 
accident modeling approach was proposed. The 
framework was based of FTA, taking the incident as 
the top event and logically constructing the 
relationships between the primary events based 
available process knowledge and insights. Once the 
FT has been structured, quantitative analysis was 
carried out to determine the top event probabilities 
based the assigned probabilities of the primary events 
and their logical relationships. Following systematic 
deduction of plausible causes of the incidents, the 
incident scenario was constructed and is represented 
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by the FT shown in Figure 3. This FT model consists of 
three intermediate elements resulting from logical 
combinations constructed based on 9 primary events 
(PE) that have been identified as potential causes of 
the popcorn incident. These PE’s are as defined in 
Table 1. 
 
Figure 3 Fault tree of popcorn polymer formation 
 
 
Table 1 Primary event for popcorn formation 
 
Index Components 
PE 1 Insufficient dosage injection of anti - 
polymerant (radical scavenger) 
PE 2 Insufficient injection of TBC (polymer 
inhibitor) 
PE 3 Failure in side stream sand filter 
PE 4 Improper tightness of flanges or seals 
PE 5 Insufficient passivation of entire equipment 
or piping system 
PE 6 Inconsistent flushing (Stagnant zone exist) 
PE 7 High distillation overhead temperature 
PE 8 Low process flow velocity 
PE 9 High distillation overhead pressure 
 
 
In addition to standard FT, the proposed model 
treated one of the intermediate elements, i.e., failure 
in process operation as a dynamic node, taking into 
consideration the changes of operating conditions in 
determining its failure probability. By using the 
updated probabilities of primary events occurrence, 
the estimated failure probability of top event can be 
revised. Combining the three components, the 
probability of failures of the top element Pr(TE) can 
thus be estimated using Eq.(1) below: 
 
𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝐸) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 ) 𝑥 {𝑃𝑟(𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) +
𝑃𝑟(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)}     (1) 
 
Note that Pr(TE) indicates the likelihood of 
occurrence of popcorn incident that are to be 
avoided by the plant. 
 
 
 
3.1  Determination of Failure Probability using 
Database 
 
For the purpose of computation, it was assumed that 
six of the primary events follow a time – dependent 
exponential distribution. The remaining three primary 
events, i.e., high distillation overhead temperature 
(PE7), low process flow velocity (PE8) and high 
distillation overhead pressure (PE9) were represented 
by covariate models, which will be explained in the 
next section. Failure data needed for the analyses 
were obtained from various history database 
including those published by Center for Chemical 
Process Safety, Offshore Reliability Data Handbook, 
CSB historical records and expert judgment. 
Intermediate failure events in chemical treatment e.g. 
the insufficient dosage of injection of anti–polymerant 
(PE1) or TBC (PE2) can be triggered by the failure of 
instrumentation components (e.g. concentration 
analyzer, controller & control valve) or mechanical 
device (e.g. pump seal leaks). The failures rate of PE1 
and PE2 were estimated by summing the failures of 
basic process control system (BPCS) instrument loops 
and mechanical devices.  In this case study, since 
both injection systems had similar instrument loops and 
type of pump, PE1 and PE2 were identical. The failure 
of instrument loops and mechanical device was 
estimated as 0.1 faults per year, respectively [8]. The 
failure of the side sand filter (PE3) was estimated 
based on result as provided by Khakzad et al. [6] with 
the assumption that improper sized filter was the only 
cause that can lead to failure.  
The failure frequency for PE4, PE5 and PE6 were 
associated with human error caused by an operator, 
maintenance personnel or vendor in carrying out their 
tasks. The failure to select of the appropriate gasket 
for proper tightness or seals for the piping and 
equipment were unlikely to happen due to stringent 
work process established for material quality 
assurance. Correct composition of chemical mixture 
for equipment and piping passivation were provided 
by supplier and prechecked by chemist prior to 
application. Insufficient passivation was also unlikely 
as a result of incorrect chemical composition used for 
passivation. Hence, the chances for the failure of PE4 
and PE5 are most likely related to maintenance 
personnel and vendor activities in carrying out 
tightness check and passivation of piping and 
equipment. Meanwhile, the BD flushing in the vertical 
overhead condenser is truly executed manually by 
operator through an on-off switch in the control room 
and is therefore subjected to human error.  
As industrial common practices, the tightness 
check of flanges or pump seals and equipment 
passivation normally will be executed as the 
opportunity for planned or unplanned process plant 
shutdown activity is available. The opportunity for 
planned process plant shutdown is once in every 3 
years as part of regulatory requirements for preventive 
maintenance. The unplanned shutdown opportunity is 
assumed as zero as the plant is designed to operate 
for consecutive 3 years. The failure probabilities of PE4 
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and PE5 were estimated by multiplying the failure of 
human factor (0.01 faults/year/opportunity) [8]  and 
1/3 opportunity is available to carry out the flanges or 
seals tightness check and piping or equipment 
passivation in a year. The BD flushing executed by the 
operator to prevent the existence of BD vapor 
stagnant scenario in vertical overhead condenser 
was also subjected to human error in executing the 
routine procedure. In this case, the operator failure 
was taken as 0.01 faults per year regardless of 
frequency of task executed by operator in a year. 
Table 2 tabulates the failure rates  and probabilities 
of primary events of fault tree for PE1 to PE6. 
 
Table 2 Prior probabilities of primary events of fault tree 
 
Index Components 𝝀 (per 
year) 
Probabi
lity 
PE 1 Insufficient dosage 
injection of anti - 
polymerant (radical 
scavenger) 
0.200 0.181 
PE 2 Insufficient injection of 
TBC (polymer inhibitor) 
0.200 0.181 
PE 3 Failure in side stream sand 
filter 
0.010 0.095 
PE 4 Improper tightness of 
flanges or seals 
0.003 0.003 
PE 5 Insufficient passivation of 
entire equipment or 
piping system 
0.003 0.003 
PE 6 Inconsistent flushing 
(Stagnant zone exist) 
0.010 0.095 
 
 
3.2  Determination of Failure Probability Using Physical 
Reliability Model 
 
The dynamic part of the model, i.e., PE7, PE8, PE9, was 
represented by a covariate function. This was 
achieved by treating the variables, i.e. temperature, 
pressure and flow rate (velocity) of the shell side 
condenser according to Weibull distribution. The 
Weibull distribution is widely employed for reliability 
related problems due to its flexibility. It can be 
identical or similar to the several others of common 
distributions [9]. The Weibull cumulative distribution 
function is defined as [10]: 
 
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝 {−(𝑡/𝜃)^𝛽 }   (2) 
Where:  
 = shape parameter (0<<) 
 = scale parameter (0<<) 
 
In order to make failure rate of Weibull distribution 
dependent on covariates, the scale parameter,  was 
assumed to be function of covariates: 
 
𝜃(𝑥) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝(∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 )    (3) 
 
The time-dependent failure rate of Weibull 
distribution is given by: 
 
𝜆(𝑡) =  𝛽𝑡𝛽−1𝜃−𝛽     (4) 
 
Substituting 𝜃(𝑋) into Eq. 4 results in: 
 
𝜆(𝑡, 𝑋) =  𝛽𝑡𝛽−1{𝐸𝑥𝑝(∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 )}
−𝛽   (5) 
 
3.3  Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) Method 
 
Given a sample of failure times {t1, … , tn} and the set 
of covariates 𝑥𝑖𝑗 associated with each failure time ( 𝑥𝑖𝑗 
is the value of the ith covariate which is associated 
with the jth failure time), MLE can be applied to 
estimate unknown parameters of the distribution. In 
this regard, flow velocity, V (PE7), overhead 
temperature, T (PE8) and pressure, P (PE9) events led 
to one common process deviation failure and with a 
Weibull distribution whose scale parameter, 𝜃, is a 
function of covariates is given as below: 
 
𝜃(𝑋) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑉 + 𝑎2𝑃 + 𝑎3𝑇)   (5)
  
Using the data in Table 1, the failure distribution 
parameters of process deviation failure (consists of 
PE7, PE8 and PE9) were estimated as β = 1.9775, a0 = 
0, a1 = -0.0108, a2 = -29.8215 and a3 = 0.3602 applying 
maximum likelihood estimation method. Since x0 = 1 
by convention, the covariate model for determining 
time-dependent failure probability F(t) the 
intermediate failure event that represents the process 
dynamics takes the following form: 
 
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝 {−(𝑡/(𝐸𝑥𝑝(−0.0108𝑉 − 29.8215𝑃 +
0.3602𝑇)))^1.9775 }    (6) 
 
3.4  Data Collection and Analysis 
 
In this study, only process variables that were thought 
to be associated with the popcorn formation were 
considered. The data for these variables, i.e., process 
temperature, pressure and inlet flow rate of overhead 
condenser, were extracted from the plant record with 
one hour interval for the period of 4 years from the 
time of plant commissioning. Process data during the 
shutdown period were excluded. The interval of failure 
time was determined based on the date of plant 
commissioned and the first time the popcorn was 
detection, or between the subsequent detections of 
the popcorn formation. The beginning of the 
undesired polymerization was assumed to happen 
when high fluctuation of overhead pressure was 
noticed, and the corresponding flow rate of BD 
product, reflux flow rate, overhead temperature and 
pressure were recorded. Since there was no flow 
measurement available at overhead column vapor 
stream, the overhead column vapor process flow rate 
was estimated by summing the flow rate of the BD 
product and reflux streams. The process flow velocity 
entering the vertical condenser was estimated by 
dividing the total mixture liquid flow rate with the total 
area of 2 inlet piping (10 inches diameter each). These 
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data were used to estimate the unknown parameters 
of Weibull distribution as tabulated in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Data used to estimate the unknown parameters of 
Weibull distribution for failure of process operation 
 
Failure 
time, ti 
(year) 
Flow 
velocity, 
m/h 
Pressure, 
kg/cm2 
Temperature, 
oC 
1.08 724.10 3.54 41.40 
0.92 828.40 3.49 40.80 
2.25 1166.03 3.38 39.51 
 
 
Note that the following assumptions were involved 
in the work: 
i. The overhead column vapor flow rate was 
equivalent to total flow rate of BD product and 
reflux flow as the BD vapor condensation rate is 
assumed to be in steady state.  
ii. The mixture of BD liquid density in the product 
and reflux stream were considered identical and 
given as 595.9 kg/m3. 
 
The starting time of high fluctuation of overhead 
column vapor pressure was considered as the starting 
time of polymerization occurred in the shell side of 
vertical overhead condenser. 
 
 
4.0  EFFECT OF PROCESS VARIABLE ON 
PROBABILITY OF POPCORN FORMATION 
 
In this research, the concept of physical reliability 
model was used to revise the probability of primary 
events of the FT, which in turn, results in top event 
updating. By incorporating primary events associated 
with process operations, i.e., PE 7, PE 8 and PE 9, 
components of process dynamic that contribute to 
the incident are illustrated in the following subsections 
below.  
 
4.1  Effect of Pressure 
 
Figure 4 indicates the effect of overhead pressure on 
the probability of the popcorn incident at constant 
temperature and entry flow velocity at 313.95 K and 
878.66 m/h respectively. The probabilities was 
constant at a lower value of 0.0066 at lower pressure 
and when the pressure exceeds 3.40 kg/cm2, the 
probability increases to a maximum value of 0.0389 
and plateaued as the pressure reached 3.50 kg/cm2.  
Note that at high pressure, the BD vapor phase is less 
protected by inhibitors because of the low volatility of 
these inhibitors e.g. TBC, thus making it more prone to 
polymer popcorn formation. 
 
4.2  Effect of Temperature 
 
The effect of overhead vapor temperature on the 
probability of top event is as illustrated in Figure 5. With 
overhead vapor pressure and inlet entry flow velocity 
were maintained constantly at 3.44 kg/cm2 and 
878.66 m/h respectively, the probability of top event 
decreases in the overhead temperature range of 
308.975 to 314.975 K and subsequently plateaued at a 
minimum value of 0.0065 as temperature exceeds 
316.975 K. This is however inconsistent with the 
argument by Aldeeb et al. [1], which claimed that the 
BD vapor at higher temperature is more susceptible to 
polymer popcorn formation. This was probably due to 
the lower composition of BD in the overhead vapor 
due to high distillation temperature and low reflux flow 
rate. Furthermore, inhibited crude butadiene liquid 
from a slip stream was also sprayed into the vapour 
inlet of the condenser to prevent the polymerization. 
 
 
Figure 4 Top event probability updating for different 
overhead pressure (P) 
 
 
Figure 5 Top event probability updating for different 
overhead temperature (T) 
 
 
4.3  Effect of Flow Velocity 
 
The probability of the top event also increases with the 
estimated BD vapor entry velocity at constant 
temperature and overhead pressure at 313.95 K and 
3.44 kg/cm2 respectively. As shown in Figure 6, the 
increasing trend is suspected to be related to the 
accumulation of the high concentrated BD vapor at 
the zone above the feed entry point of the vertical 
condenser as a result of a layer of barrier formed by 
high BD vapor entry velocity, making it more 
vulnerable to reaction initiation. 
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Figure 6 Top event probability updating for different 
estimated entry velocity (V) 
 
 
4.4  Recommendation for Plant Operation 
 
The results obtained have proven that high boiling 
points of many of these inhibitors render them 
effective primarily in the liquid phase leaving the 
gaseous phase more vulnerable to reaction initiation. 
The results also indicated the impact of changes in the 
plant operating conditions can be studied using the 
proposed failure model. Examples have been given in 
Figures 4-6. The tabulated results in Table 4 indicated 
that the overhead pressure was the dominant. At 
constant temperature and estimated vapor entry 
velocity, the effect of overhead pressure on risk profile 
was much larger than that of temperature and 
estimated vapor entry velocity. Thus, based on the 
finding of this study, more attention should be given to 
managing the overhead pressure. 
 
Table 4 The changes in probability of the top event for each 
unit changes of the physical parameters 
 
Physical Parameter Probability ∆, 𝐏𝐫 (𝑻𝑬)
/𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕 
Pressure, kg/cm2 3.5000 0.0389 0.3250/ 
kg/cm2 3.4000 0.0064 
Temperature, K 314.9750 0.0086 -0.0051 
/K 308.9750 0.0389 
Velocity, m/h 1044.3300 0.0389 0.0002/ 
(m/h) 894.3300 0.0117 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the probability of top events at 
varying operating pressure at constant temperature 
and inlet entry flow velocity of 308.975 K and 878.66 
m/h, respectively. The curves clearly demonstrate the 
dynamic effect of operating pressure to the 
probability of popcorn formation. The temperature of 
308.975 K was chosen based on the results shown in 
Figure 6.  
Note that the results indicated that the high 
probability value is reached within a year when the 
operating pressure if the operating pressure is fixed at 
3.44 kg/cm2, and about 2 years for operating pressure 
of 3.42 kg/cm2. This is consistent with the actual 
incident experienced by the plant considered in this 
study. The model is therefore considered to be a 
reasonable representation of the failure case and 
should therefore be useful to be used as a guide for 
preventive maintenance planning, risk management 
efforts or any management of change activities. The 
optimal interval for major process facilities 
maintenance program also can be determined 
based on the estimated probability of top event as 
illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Top event probability updating at different pressure 
within 10 years 
 
 
These revised probabilities of the top event directly 
update the estimated risk associated with safety, 
health, environment and direct financial impacts to 
the business operation. However, among the different 
pairs of covariates (overhead pressure), the optimum 
condition should be chosen in order to optimize the 
operating cost without compromising reliability and 
process safety of the existing process facility. 
 
 
5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
This work combined FT with dynamic risk analysis 
concepts to incorporate dynamic process operating 
condition in failure analysis. Based on the results 
obtained in this study the following conclusion can be 
made: 
i. The use of Weibull distribution in the FT model has 
been proven as an effective way of 
incorporating process dynamics into risk analysis 
thus making dynamic risk assessment possible in 
a convenient manner. 
ii. In the case study considered, operating pressure 
was the dominant process variable to the 
probability of popcorn polymer formation in the 
case study considered.  
iii. The top event probability can be monitored 
based on the plant operating condition, thus 
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providing opportunities for dynamically 
managing the risk of incidents. The information 
can be used by risk managers to determine the 
interval of preventive maintenance e.g. cleaning 
activities in overhead condenser of the BD 
column based on the estimated probability.  
This work has illustrates the importance of dynamic 
risk assessment in facilitating the operation of process 
plants in the chemical process industries. Further 
refinements of the approach by incorporating more 
accurate probability estimation approaches, and 
including various other potential sources of failures 
such as natural disasters or manmade hazards can 
provide more values to the current works. 
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